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1. Introduction 
In the last decades the concept of ‘security’ has been significantly modified. In addition to the orthodox 
understanding of it as military threats to state sovereignty, now we also talk about economic, human or 
environmental forms of security. Barry Buzan (1997: 7) argues that the environment entered the 
securitization discourse in the 1960s when scholars began to question the ways in which people impact the 
environment through often irreversible changes and how this in turn impacts on the human condition (see 
also Floyd 2008). Since then, the idea of environmental securitisation continued to evolve, including, the 
introduction of the concept of anthropogenic climate change into the political discourse at the end of the 
1980s. By 1995 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) began to hold 
annual international conferences dedicated to finding solutions to anthropogenic global warming, and 
climate change began to appear in the political and security documents of various states.   
The negative consequences of climate change can undermine developed economies and bring 
devastation to less stable states (Mazo 2009). Climate change has already led to economic loss, rising sea 
levels, changes in agricultural productivity and related processes, freshwater and food scarcities, the 
emergence of new types of diseases, has caused environmental refugees and migration, and so on (Dalby 
2013; IPCC 2013; Purvis & Busby 2004). Even though it is difficult to confirm the direct link between violent 
conflicts and environmental degradation, environmental change is increasingly becoming one of the factors 
influencing the military conflicts or at least it acts as a ‘threat multiplier’ (Depledge & Feaking 2012; Mazo 
2009: 126).1 As Joshua Busby notes ‘even taking a narrow definition of national security, there are clearly 
ways in which climate change already constitutes a national security’ threat (2008: 470).  
 Despite its overall global character, the destructive effect of climate change differs depending on 
geographical location. For some countries it has already become a pressing issue threatening their existence, 
whilst other states still treat it as just one of the features of international relations (Barnett 2003). This leads 
to different perceptions of climate change securitisation. For instance, the European Union (EU) or small 
pacific island states have become the main advocates of treating climate change as a security issue, but until 
very recently China paid little attention to climate problems or insisted on discussing it only ‘in terms of 
sustainable development’ (Scott 2012: 226). The attempts of European more economically advanced 
countries to pursue their agendas is still seen as a way to avoid the historical responsibility and shift blame 
for climate change onto developing countries. Overall, depending on economic and geographical 
characteristics, responding to climate change can be a choice between adaptation, or survival (Barnett 2003; 
Barnett & Adger 2007).  
Even within the same political entity, such as the EU, different actors perceive the problem in different 
ways. The ‘older’ member states (e.g. Germany, France, UK) are more proactive in their move towards low-
carbon economies, and take the lead in international negotiations on climate change, whilst the ‘newer’ 
members (e.g. the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) are more concerned with their economic stability 
and energy security. Arguably, due to these internal disagreements, the EU failed to take the lead during the 
climate change conference in Copenhagen in 2009.2 If we look at Europe in a broader geographical context, 
then it shows even more disperse approaches to climate change problems. This chapter aims to demonstrate 
these differences through the comparative study of the Russian Federation (RF) and the UK, whose 
perceptions of climate change are influenced not only by geographical characteristics (territorial size, access 
to natural resources, climate conditions), but also by the perception of the problem influenced by the states’ 
historical legacies. This is where the concept of memory and temporality comes into play and allows us to 
                                                          
1 The connection between climate change and an open military conflict should be considered together with other 
social, economic and political factors (Barnett & Adger 2007: 644). 
2 The conference was supposed to produce a new legally binding document in its pursuit of mitigating climate change, 
however, this was not achieved due to major disagreements between the largest polluters as well as between 
developing and developed countries.   
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see how this very prolonged and quite obscure (for the general public) problem (climate change) is being 
affected by the memory of national responsibility, relations with nature and the contemporary issues of 
economic and social developments.  
To achieve this aim, the chapter looks at the media discourse of climate change in the RF and the UK, 
which, arguably, are situated at opposite ‘poles’ of the national environmental policies development. 
Through the application of the Copenhagen School approach to ‘securitisation’ and through consideration of 
the temporal aspects of discourse (memory studies), the chapter examines how national news media outlets 
address climate change issues in terms of memory, risk and security. In order to get a clear sense of official 
discourse on the memory and securitization of climate change, the cases are approached by studying the 
news websites RIA Novosti and BBC News. Contributing to the growing body of literature on discourse 
analysis of climate change securitization (Detraz & Betsill 2009, Hayes and Knox-Hayes 2014, Rogers-Hayden 
et al. 2011), this chapter demonstrates that the British and Russian cases share multiple similarities in the 
way climate change risks are ‘remembered’ in the media discourse, especially in terms of the employment 
of the securitizing actor and the referent object. However, they do differ in the proposed solution to the 
climate change security threat with the Russian news agency paying more attention to adaptation strategies 
and the British media outlet concentrating on mitigation, thus yielding a difference, which has to do with the 
historical account of the states’ climate policy and national memory of this environmental risk.  
It should be noted that whilst history has some degree of objectivity (as a recollection of past events), 
its subjectivity is manifested through the ‘connection of the past with the present’ (Rusen 2008: 1) or in other 
words through our interpretation or our ‘remembering’ of the past. Where memory is seen as a selective 
past which is influenced by current social, economic and political processes. It is also understood here, that 
the national memory to some extent serves as a foundation for our individual memory practices (Phillips and 
Reyers 2011) where media play an important role in serving as a communicative bridge between the national 
past and the present, by recording the state’s history they shape our national memory (Edy 1999). Therefore, 
it could be argued that whilst the individuals living in the studied countries will be subjected to their personal 
experiences in the way they perceive and understand climate change risks, they also will in some way be 
influenced by state practices in constructing memory on climate change and media interpretation of these 
practices.   
The chapter begins with an introduction to the debate on securitisation and climate change which is 
then followed by an outline of the RF and UK’s national climate policies and the discussion of the role of 
media in communicating climate change risks. The chapter proceeds with an analysis of the selected news 
items and the discussion of the results.     
2. Securitising climate change 
According to the Copenhagen School, securitization of any issue happens at the moment when it starts to be 
discussed as a security issue. It has to move from ‘ordinary democratic politics’ to the realm of urgency, 
where the ‘audience’ accepts this repositioning of the issue (Scott 2012: 221; Trombetta 2008). In the case 
of climate change it means that the problem should no longer be seen as only a matter of economic 
development or political disagreement, but as a source of direct threat to peoples’ wellbeing and/or the 
safety of the state. This would ‘heighten […] the sense of urgency surrounding the issue and thereby giv[e] 
impetus to greater commitment and prioritization’ (Scott 2012: 229; Busby 2008). Nicole Detraz (2011: 105) 
notes that ‘framing climate change as a threat to human security, is the best option for creating policies 
designed to address human vulnerability to a changing climate’.  
The problem here is that even though numerous studies identify a range of negative consequences of 
climate change, in practice it becomes quite difficult to estimate the threat from ‘the collapse of the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet or the failure of the monsoon season in East Asia’ (Depledge and Feaking 2012: S76) and, 
therefore, place climate change within the security realm. Equally, climate change is construed as part of the 
individual and national memory (Geoghegan and Leyson 2012) due to the unavailability of conceptualisation 
of global memories of climate change until recently, thus providing a contradictory system of remembering 
and securitizing in relation to national and cross-national memoryscapes. Despite these obstacles, the notion 
of security entered climate change discourse as early as 1988 when the conference titled ‘The Changing 
Atmosphere: Implication for Global Security’ took place in Toronto (Detraz 2011: 108). It became one of the 
3 
 
very first times when hundreds of climate scientists were able to communicate their findings and discuss 
them with economists and policy-makers from various countries. The ‘security theme’ featured in the 
conference’s title also became one of the main messages, as has been recorded in the conference’s final 
statement: ‘unanticipated and unplanned change may well become the major non-military threat to 
international security and the future of the global economy’ (WMO 1988). The authors of the statement 
urged to pay attention to the problem of environmental degradation which might lead to both political and 
economic instability. Thus, in comparison with other events, the discursive memory around climate change 
is quite short, which has impact on the process of securitization.  
Some scholars do not praise this idea of moving environmental issues into the security realm and argue 
that the environment should be ‘desecuritised’ and moved to the sphere of normal politics which will lead to 
more constructive and productive processes of dealing with the problem (Wæver 1995), where climate 
change would be dealt with in a deliberative manner instead of a top-down approach of the military order. 
Nina Hayrynen justifies this process of de-securitization by stating that ‘labelling non-military problems as 
security issues might cause ordinary people to remain passive […] by using security rhetoric it is easy to 
legitimate almost anything’ (2003: 80). For instance, by hiding behind the securitization discourse ‘with its 
logic of imminent threat and immediate response’ state officials can pursue ‘short-term policies that lack 
long-term public support’ (Hayes and Knox-Hayes 2014: 86). This way the ‘shield’ of securitization can be 
used by governments to delay their actions and responses and keep the problem only in the domain of 
rhetoric (the domain of memory) where the urgency and fear re-stated in numerous speeches are not 
transferred into actual deeds (with the exception of recursive memory actions).  
Olaf Corry, partly supporting this de-securitisation concept, suggests we treat climate change from the 
perspective of ‘risk’ rather than ‘security’ which will allow us ‘to move beyond the dichotomy of “normal” 
de-securitised politics versus “emergency” securitised politics’ and consider ‘not just existential threat-based 
security politics but all forms of appeals to danger and harm’ (2011: 256). 
3. The Russian Federation and climate change 
The RF is one of the biggest Green House Gas (GHG) emitters in the world and is one of the most difficult 
actors in international climate change politics. For example, it had been causing obstacles in the way of 
developing responses to global climate change such as the Kyoto Protocol negotiations (Afionis and 
Chatzopoulos 2010; Andonova 2008; Buchner and Dall’Olio 2005; Korppoo 2008). However, during Dmitry 
Medvedev’s presidency3 (2008-2012) there was a shift in the official rhetoric on climate change and even 
some changes in relevant domestic policies. At the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen in 2009, President Medvedev referred to the RF as the leader of GHG reduction (President of 
the RF website 2009). Even though he decided not to mention the fact that the RF was still among the leaders 
in GHG emissions, Medvedev’s speech showed how the Russian Federation wanted to be perceived. Around 
the same time, at the federal level, the Russian Climate Doctrine (2009) was adopted. This was followed by 
the acceptance of the Climate Doctrine Implementation Plan (2011) and the appointment of a presidential 
advisor for climate change Alexander Bedritsky. This change was reinforced in March 2010 at the meeting of 
Russia’s State Security Council which focused ‘on measures to prevent threats to national security in relation 
to global climate change’ (President of the RF website 2010). In his address to the Council, Medvedev stated 
that ‘it cannot be forgotten that climate change can cause not only changes in the environment, but also 
interstate disagreements connected with energy security, use of sea routes, natural resources, deficits in 
water and food’ (President of the RF website 2010).4 He further underlined the necessity to ensure the 
environmental security and the economic security of the country: ‘We should be ready for any scenario and 
use it to the benefit of our economy in order to reinforce the power of our state and defend our citizens from 
                                                          
3 When Dmitry Medvedev came into power in 2008 and Vladimir Putin subsequently assumed the post of Prime 
Minister, there was a slight change towards a more liberal way of governing. Whilst in practice not much changed and 
Putin was still extremely influential, Medvedev was able to popularise the idea of modernisation in politics and 
economics.     
4 In this case Medvedev refers mostly to the changes in the Arctic (the internationally-recognised Russian part as well 
as the disputed territories), which due to the active policy of other circumpolar states might threaten Russia’s 
economic plans in the region, once again prioritising economic interests over environmental concerns.    
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the negative consequences of climate change’ (President of the RF website 2010). Medvedev’s speech 
indicates that climate change is mostly associated with economic risks or advantage, in case of the Arctic 
trade route. This connection between climate change and economic development can be seen as a positive 
trend for Russian climate change policy as it finally allowed state’s officials to see the profitable side of dealing 
with climate change. However, there is a danger in diminishing the climate change problem. As David Toke 
and Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou notice ‘the “green economy” frame is another attempt to avoid the 
implication that the economy will have to “sacrifice” in order to deal with climate change’ (2013: 542). 
Following the Security Council meeting, the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation, Iurii Averianov, in his interview with Rossiiskaia Gazeta listed all possible security risks which 
climate change might bring to the RF (Kozlova 2010).5 Bringing climate change to the agenda of the Russian 
Security Council has established a relative equality between this environmental problem and other 
traditional security issues such as military conflicts or terrorism.  
4. The UK and climate change  
As regards its political discourse, the UK views itself as one of the world’s leaders in terms of involvement in 
international climate change policy and in promoting and sustaining a successful climate policy at the national 
level (Harris 2012). In 2008 the UK passed ‘The Climate Change Act’ which committed the country to an 80 
percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2050. The Act became the first of its kind in the world and ‘has come 
to play a central role in the UK’s image as a leader on climate change’ mitigation (Lockwood 2013). Climate 
policy in the UK is well institutionalised, with the Department for Energy and Climate Change leading UK GHG 
reduction policy, the Department for Environment and Rural Affairs being responsible for the UK adaptation 
policy and the Committee on Climate Change advising the government on national GHG emissions reduction 
targets (gov.uk 2014). The UK was also an initiator to bring climate change to the security dimensions by 
insisting on including it into the UN Security Council’s agenda (Depledge & Feaking 2012: S77). At the national 
level, since 2008 the UK has included climate change in the National Security Strategy (NSS 2008). The 
alarming narrative surrounding the climate change discussion within the UK Security Strategy has placed the 
problem not just among other security risks outlined in the document, but as one of the ‘drivers of 
insecurities’ (NSS 2008: 16) which should be at the top of the state’s priorities.  
In 2005 David Cameron made the environment (and climate change in particular) a central theme in 
his attempt of ‘decontamination’ of his party’s brand which previously was known for its reluctance towards 
environmental problems (Carter 2009).6 However, in 2009 with the financial crisis taking its toll on the state’s 
economy, the UK has actively pushed the climate change agenda to the background due to people becoming 
more concerned with growing energy costs. As Matthew Lockwood notes ‘since the Climate Change Act was 
passed, the political visibility of the cost of climate policies in the energy sector passed through to consumers 
via energy bills has increased, mainly due to hostile media coverage and comment by opponents’ (2013: 
1343). Consequently, during the 2010 elections, climate change yielded its political appeal for the 
parliamentary candidates making them concentrate on other issues (Rootes and Carter 2010). However, 
despite the decline in interest among politicians, climate change managed to remain amongst the 
government’s security concerns which is supported by the UK climate change risk assessment report (2012). 
The social and political dilemma between economic stability and environmental concerns can be illustrated 
through the debate around shale gas development in the UK. This unconventional fossil fuel (extraction of 
which involves the controversial fracking technology) provoked polar responses among UK politicians and 
the general public. Some people actively support the ban of shale gas extraction due to its environmentally 
harmful nature and negative contribution to climate change. Whilst others see it as a source of energy 
security and cleaner energy which will serve as a ‘bridge fuel’ towards the development of renewable energy 
sources (O’Hara et al. 2013). 
The UK election campaign of 2015 again showed the political leaders’ ambiguous attitude towards 
climate change. In February 2015 the representatives of the Coalition government, David Cameron and Nick 
                                                          
5 For example, damage to buildings and infrastructure situated in permafrost (due to the prolonged thawing season), 
depletion of water resources, increasing risks of floods.    
6 In 2006 the Conservative party launched a new logo depicting a green tree to emphasize its commitment to the 
environment and equality.   
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Clegg, and the leader of the opposition, Ed Miliband, signed a cross-party pledge on climate change (Harrabin 
2015). Simultaneously, the environment was downplayed throughout the election campaign by all parties 
(even, relatively speaking, by the Green Party) (Evans 2015) with priorities, once again, given to the economy. 
However, in summer 2015 the Conservative Party—now having a majority in the parliament and being free 
from the constraints of their previous coalition with Liberal Democrats—made a U-turn on their previous 
environmental pledges. For example, the Coalition government introduced general subsidies to encourage 
households to install solar panels; in August 2015 the Conservative government decided to slash the ‘feed-in 
tariff’ by nearly 90 per cent, a decision, which The Daily Telegraph reported as ‘the end of Britain's “solar 
revolution”' (Dominiczak 2015). The newspaper, which supports the Conservative party, critiqued Cameron 
for his attitude to environmental issues by citing him saying 'get rid of the green crap' to his aides in 2013. 
These comments emphasize the complex nature of official discourse over climate change in the UK and 
demonstrate how economic concerns often take over environmental ones.   
Similar processes but on a different scale were observed in the latest developments of Russian climate 
policy. In 2010 the RF confirmed that it will not be a part of the second commitment period to the Kyoto 
Protocol. The official position is that Russia will support a future agreement only if it follows the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (Bedritsky 2014). Since 2014 the Russian political situation has 
created unfavourable conditions towards environmental policies, with priorities placed on the international 
tension provoked by the Ukrainian conflict and the subsequent economic crisis. In 2015 the Russian 
government withdrew its support for the energy efficiency plans and have set quite modest goals for carbon 
emission reductions (25-30 percent to the baseline year of 1990) (Davydova 2015). At the same time the 
latest Russian Assessment Report of Climate Change and its Consequences confirmed the country’s 
vulnerability to the negative consequences of climate change by stressing that the average temperature in 
the RF has been increasing faster than the global temperature rise (Roshydromet 2014). 
The UK and Russia’s oscillating interest in climate change has to be considered in relative terms with 
regards to the states’ own previous history of climate policy. Despite climate change’s prolonged and 
constantly increasing damaging character, it fails to maintain the states’ constant attention. Whilst other 
more acute and, from policy–makers’ points of view, more timely problems such as elections, military 
conflicts or economic slowdowns catch the attention of power elites and the general public. In both the 
Russian and British cases at some point in time the state has come to the decision to bring climate change 
into the security realm, however, again in both cases climate change could not compete with economic and 
energy security and has to be either framed within these concepts or ‘lose’ to them. The danger here is that 
when climate change is interlinked with economic or energy security concepts, then the perception of the 
problem can be altered drastically from seeing ‘climate change as a threat’ to ‘environmental policy as a 
threat’ (Trombetta 2008: 596). The latter contributes to the further perception of economic vulnerability 
which provokes political actors to ensure the stability of the situation. The specific steps might include 
modest commitments under the international agreements, low carbon taxes or state support of fossil fuels 
industries. Whilst, as has been stated before, treating climate change as one of the biggest problems for the 
state is more likely to stimulate pro-active responses from the interested parties. Arguably, governments 
have a task of reacting to current events and short-term problems which are in the centre of media discourse 
(the effect of short-term memory), whereas climate change belongs to the doing of long-term memory 
events, thus requiring a specific mode of representation in media.   
5. Communicating climate change  
The significant role of mass media in popularising the environmental risk has been outlined by Ulrich Beck, 
as follows: ‘[risks] can be changed,  magnified, dramatized or minimized within knowledge, and to that 
extent, they are particularly open to social definition and construction’ (1994: 23). Since 2005 the topic of 
‘social construction’ of climate change through media coverage has generated significant interest among 
scholars.7 Indeed media play an important role in popularising climate change and the risks associated with 
it. However, climate change is traditionally considered to be a difficult topic for journalists to write about. 
                                                          
7 See, for example, Antilla 2005; Bell 1994; Boykoff 2008; Boykoff & Boykoff 2007; Butler & Pigeon 2009; Carvalho 
2005; Carvalho & Burgess 2005; Doyle 2011; Doulton & Brown 2007; Lewis & Boyce 2009; Liu et al. 2011; Lockwood 
2009; Olausson 2009; Pidgeon 2009; Poberezhskaya 2014.  
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Regarded as an ‘unobtrusive issue’ (Shanahan & Good 2000) climate change creates additional barriers for 
journalists. For instance, ‘obtrusive issues’ such as financial crises, directly influence people’s lives and 
therefore create a clear picture of their negative impact. Climate change, being quite abstract in terms of its 
impact on our everyday activities, puts pressure on journalists to draw links between ‘global warming, 
weather extremes, flooding and human activity’ (Gavin et al. 2011: 433). In this process journalists have to 
negotiate local and global concerns as well as shape the collective memory of environmental risks by 
‘“lean[ing]” on the past in order to give meaning to the present’ (Zandberg 2010: 7).  
This issue relates to the overall problem of journalists determining the news value of climate change 
topics, where to be published topics need to have personal relevance for the audience, a dramatic edge, clear 
storyline and, preferably, be supported by authoritative information sources (Boykoff & Boykoff 2007; 
Carvalho 2007; Poberezhskaya 2015). Being such a prolonged scientific phenomenon with a highly politicised 
nature, climate change often struggles to meet these criteria. Even the characteristic of high-quality 
journalism – the representation of all views on the subject matter – creates a controversial situation where 
one side is supported by the majority of the scientific community, and another by a small but very vocal group 
of climate sceptics or deniers. Lately, this has become a less significant problem in the West (Boykoff 2007; 
Doulton & Brown 2007; Grundmann & Scott 2014), but it still can be found in countries like the RF where the 
climate change debate is lagging behind (Poberezhskaya 2015). Finally, the media coverage of climate change 
problem is influenced by politics. Media attention peaks around major political events (e.g. international 
conferences on climate change) (Schafer et al. 2014) and climate discourse is often shaped by socio-political 
factors where media ‘remain within the broad ideological parameters of free-market capitalism and neo-
liberalism’ (Carvalho 2005: 21). The latest advancement of new media offers a chance for more diverse 
climate discourse in a particular temporal framework. As information on the internet cannot be deleted—
the so-called ‘web-presentism’—it makes memory of past environmental events readily available for use, 
thus blurring the boundaries between short-term and long-term memory events. In addition new media 
allows for the diversification of the sources of information and the diversion of attention from politicians and 
the scientific community towards civil society groups and the general public (Hestres 2014; O’Neil & Boykoff 
2011). But, as studies demonstrate, the freedom of the internet leads to some negative outcomes, for 
example, by stimulating another wave of climate scepticism and questioning of the scientific findings (Martin 
& Rice 2014).   
Media outlets can be considered as the ‘collective memory agents’ (Zandberg 2010: 7) whose approach 
to recording information creates and re-creates the way climate change is remembered and consequently 
perceived by the audience. Currently, there are a very limited number of people who have not heard of global 
warming (World Bank 2010), however, for many it remains an abstract idea with unclear causes and 
consequences where mass media maintain their prominent role in ‘translating’ climate change risks. The 
media has a capacity to connect people’s scattered recollections of various weather events which they 
experience throughout their lives and form the concept of climate ‘normality’ (for their geographical region) 
or ‘abnormality’. The latter then can be evolved into the idea of climate as a ‘threat’ to personal or national 
security.   
6. Methodological considerations 
Barry Buzan states that in order for issues to become securitized ‘they have to be staged as existential threats 
to a referent object by a securitizing actor’ (1997: 13). Buzan develops his argument by stating that ‘the 
process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech-act. It is not interesting as a sign 
referring to something more real, it is the utterance itself that is the act: by saying it something is done’ 
(1997: 14). This research project suggests analysis of media discourse as a representation of a ‘speech-act’. 
Jarrod Hayes and Janelle Knox-Hayes in their application of discourse analysis to their EU-US comparative 
study demonstrate that the way climate change is connected with the concept of security can explain states’ 
responses to climate threats (2014). Whilst Tee Rogers-Hayde et al. through the application of critical 
discourse analysis conclude that by bringing climate change to energy security realm has provided 
justification for advancing nuclear energy in the UK (2011). These findings feed directly into the idea that 
different ‘conceptualisations of climate security’ lead to ‘different responses to climate change as a security 
concern’ (McDonald 2013: 42). Hence, studying and understanding the security discourse within the climate 
change debate allows us to achieve a greater comprehension of various climate policies.  
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In order to get the closest sense of official positions on the securitization of climate change, I approach 
the Russian state-owned news agency RIA Novosti and the British BBC News which predominately reproduce 
the central and the most popular discourses in the country (it is accepted that the selected media’s 
ideological stands and relations to the official discourse do differ to some extent). Even though RIA Novosti 
and BBC News belong to different types of media (with the former operating as a news agency, and the latter 
being part of a larger broadcasting corporation), both reveal how notions of memory, security and climate 
change, are articulated by respective government, find their way into media discourse. In both cases only the 
news which were published on their publicly accessible websites (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news and 
http://ria.ru/) were analysed. The data was collected from 1st June 2013 until 31st May 2014. A random 
sample of 100 articles from each source included news stories which, firstly, contained extensive reference 
to the subject of climate change or global warming (not just mentioning it among other discussed issues) and, 
secondly, referred to the topics of security. A combination of the following keywords was used: ‘climate 
change, global warming, risk, threat, security, danger’. Acknowledging that the selected number of articles is 
of an arbitrary nature, the study pursues an explorative task of determining existing security themes in the 
media discourses of respective countries and it does not aim to generalise its results. However, it is believed 
that the conducted analysis provides a strong foundation for future studies.  
By applying the methodological approach of discourse analysis (van Dijk 1991), the linguistic 
characteristics of the texts were assessed: choice of vocabulary, structures of the sentences, use of 
metaphors and so on. This allowed for the analysis of news dedicated to climate change in terms of the way 
this environmental issue is associated with the concept of security. James Gee (2011: ix) states that ‘anyone 
who engages in their own discourse analysis must adapt the tools they have taken from a given theory to the 
needs and demands of their own study’, hence, this research study concentrates on the particular elements 
of the analysed media discourse. In each article the following components of a ‘speech act’ were identified: 
a securitising actor (who in the news articles connects climate change with the security concept), a referent 
object (who is in the article presented as a victim or an object of climate threat) and also what response is 
proposed within the studied text (adaptation or mitigation). Within each of the elements a number of 
relevant categories were identified, which are presented with the findings in the following sections 
7. Identifying the ‘securitising actor’ in the news discourse 
Both UK and Russian media outlets refer to a diverse range of actors when climate change is addressed as a 
memory and security issue. During the coding process eight categories were identified: international and 
domestic officials (including various rank politicians), international and domestic scientists, NGOs, 
community members and international organisations (see Table 1).   
 






The identified actors would either directly refer to climate change as a memory and security issue, or 
allude to its destructive consequences. The legitimacy of these information sources which allows them to act 
as securitising actors comes from either their official position (e.g. members of the government or 
parliament), their knowledge/expertise (scientists/activists) or personal experience of climate change threats 
(community members). There are several interesting findings which were discovered in this part of the 
analysis. Both RIA Novosti and BBC News coverage was dominated by scientists as the media outlets’ main 
securitising actors. One of the reasons behind these results is that in 2013-2014 three Working Group reports 
for policymakers (as part of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report) were released. They provided more evidence 
of human induced climate change and its already observed consequences, such as melting of polar ice and a 
subsequent rise in sea levels as well as its potential risks (IPCC 2013). These events jolted our memory of 
climate change manifestations and altered the public’s attitude to them. However, the media outlets do 
differ in the way they utilise scientific data. Whilst BBC News predominately quotes the opinions of the 
domestic scientific community, the Russian news agency concentrates on international sources. The 
difference can be explained by the history of national climate science. The UK, being at the front of climate 
research, is famous for its very strong institutionalisation of climate change studies (Hulme and Turnpenny 
2004). Russian scientists, although greatly contributing to the world’s research on climate change (e.g. 
Aleksander Voeikov, Michael Budyko, Yuri Izrael or 14 Russian authors of the latest IPCC report), have a 
history of either encountering barriers in the form of the rather uncooperative government, being torn apart 
by disagreement over the anthropogenic nature of climate change and its consequences for the country or 
generally having a feeling of mistrust towards journalists community and sometimes being reluctant to 
communicate their findings and ideas (Poberezhskaya 2015; Wilson Rowe 2013). Russia’s preference of 
international science over domestic science could also be explained by the country’s overall perception of its 
role in global politics. Constantly trying to re-establish itself as an important geopolitical player, the RF seems 
to be in persistent need of external confirmation: in this case confirmation by the global scientific community 
of what climate change means for the world and subsequently for Russia. Once again, we are encountering 
the influence of memory or temporality where the contemporary discourse of the problem has to be 
considered within the longer historical context of Russian and British political history and climate science.  
With regards to the official figures performing the role of securitizing actors, the following difference 
has been observed. In the Russian case, in 13 of the 100 articles studied, the Russian Ministry for Civil 
Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters proclaimed the danger of 
climate change. In four articles the exact same information was reproduced with claims that ‘risks of 
emergency situations, due to the process of global climate change and economic activity, carry significant 
threats to people and the state’s economy’ (e.g. RIA Novosti 2013a). Due to the high authority of the Ministry 
of Emergencies in Russia, the fact that it confirmed the dangers of this environmental problem is a very clear 













role in inscribing climate change events such as the Novorossiisk floods of 2002 into the national memory, 
therefore creating a singular space of memory and trauma). This official institution is important not only 
because it is responsible for ensuring the protection of the state against natural disasters, but also because 
it is closely connected to Russia’s overall security policy. For example, in 2012 Sergey Shoygu who served as 
the Head of the Ministry of Emergencies for 11 years, was removed from this position and appointed as 
Minister of Defence. In the British media outlet, the official sources represented a range of political actors in 
the country starting with the PM David Cameron, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change Ed 
Davey, and the Leader of the Opposition, Ed Miliband representing all major political parties in the country. 
It can be argued that whilst in the Russian case the voice of ‘domestic officials’ is quite unified, in the UK we 
can witness the example of how BBC News pursues its conventions and represents a wide political spectrum 
in climate coverage. 
  Overall, contrary to the expectations which stem from our knowledge of the political and media 
systems of these two countries, both BBC News and RIA Novosti follow the same pattern in identifying 
securitising actors in their coverage of climate change by giving priority to a scientific community which is 
then followed by ‘domestic officials’, whilst representatives of civil society and international organisations 
play a somewhat less significant role.  The aspect of temporality was evident in the rhetoric of climate change 
commemoration among the analysed securitizing actors where environmental risks were interpreted within 
the states’ scientific traditions and related to the present manifestation of climate change in order to ensure 
relevance for the target audience.    
8. Identifying the ‘referent object’ in the news discourse 
During the analysis of RIA Novosti and BBC News, the identified ‘referent objects’, which are proclaimed to 
be under threat by the securitising actors, were divided into five categories: ecosystem, global community, 
global economy, states’ security (any state besides the UK and Russia), and all references to the UK (by BBC 
News) and the RF (by RIA Novosti) were put into the category – ‘the State’.   




As can be seen in table 2 both national media outlets followed the same pattern. The greatest concern 
was related to the fate of the ‘global community’ – how will humanity survive the negative consequences of 
climate change, which is a long-term memory effect. Whilst BBC News mostly concentrated on particular 
events such as a typhoon in the Philippines, RIA Novosti provided more general discussion of the threats 
posed by climate change within the context of the next climate conference or a global agreement on climate 
change. Possibly, again due to the influence of the publication of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, in both 



















the potential shortage in food supply. For example, BBC environmental reporter Matt McGrath (2014a) 
claims that ‘food security is not just about developing countries’, but also the leaders of the economic and 
socially developed states (e.g. Japan) have to figure what to do about it. Looking at the whole world as an 
object of climate change threat is understandable and quite logical due to the nature of this problem. 
However, it can be argued that by distancing it from the audience and speaking about more general problems 
of drought, floods, food shortage (without making the connection with the reader’s specific needs and fears) 
it can make climate change seem irrelevant to people’s everyday problems (McManus 2000), either because 
it is happening too far away or it is not happening yet (so it is perceived as a problem of the future).    
With regards to the category of ‘the States’ security’, it has been noted that a few articles, which were 
coded under this title, have shown an interesting tendency. The UK news mostly discussed the vulnerability 
of the poor states and potential disappearance of them due to sea level rise or the inability to fight extreme 
weather events (for example, Siddle’s (2013) article on Kiribati island). Whereas the Russian news have talked 
about states’ security in a traditional way of discussing potential links between climate change and the war 
with some articles referring to the research studies conducted by the international scholars on linking climate 
change and conflicts in Africa as well as an overall connection between military conflicts in human history 
and climatic changes (RIA Novosti 2014a; Telishev 2013).  
Table 2 indicates, there is a slight difference between UK and Russian news coverage in terms of 
designating the security referent object. For example, Russian news media dedicated more articles to the 
dangers imposed on the global ecosystem (degradation of water systems or negative impacts on non-human 
animal life, whereas almost half of Russian media coverage discussed either the overall fragility of the Arctic 
or its animals (in particular polar bears)). The British news more often discussed the concerns of the global 
community (for instance, people struggling with extreme weather events in various places, environmental 
refugees, health risks and so on). This finding can be a sign of a slight difference in the media outlets’ vision 
of climate change risks. Going back to the historical differences in Russian and British climate policies 
discussed above, it has been revealed that in the UK climate change as a security risk has entered the political 
discourse much earlier and has even managed to establish itself in national legal documents. Therefore, 
climate change has trespassed the territory of national memory and security as not only a threat to the state’s 
natural environment, but also as a danger to human security. In the Russian case, the climate debate is still 
evolving within both political and public discourses and whilst it might be difficult to explain how a ‘warmer 
climate’ can be seen as a danger for northern countries, it is much easier to refer to Russia’s beloved Arctic 
and its wild life which play an important part in Russian official discourse (Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya 
2016).    
BBC News and RIA Novosti conveyed worries about the dangers imposed by climate change to their 
respective countries. In both cases the main drive for the rising security concerns was a number of extreme 
weather events which had happened in the RF and the UK over the studied period. Even though, in most 
cases journalists were very careful in linking certain episodes of ‘bad weather’ to climate change (e.g. 
McGrath 2014b), the floods and storms in the RF and the UK have triggered an alarming coverage. This type 
of coverage has arguably led to an increase in the ‘news value’ (Harcup and O’Neill 2001) of climate change 
by making it more relevant to the audience in terms of its geographical location (climate change is affecting 
‘your’ country) and time (underlining the urgency of addressing climate change problems).  For instance, in 
one of the articles for BBC News, journalist Ross Hawkins quotes the political leader of Green Party, Natalie 
Bennett: ‘This is an emergency situation we're facing now’ (2014). At the same time, RIA Novosti (2014e) 
raises the alarm that ‘climate change has already led to a significant increase in the number of large scale 
natural disasters in Russia’. Interestingly, in one of the studied articles, RIA Novosti refutes the opinion of the 
Russian Minister of Agriculture Nikolay Fedorov who stated that climate change would be beneficial for 
Russian agriculture. By quoting a representative of the WWF-Russia, the news article concludes that whilst 
the RF will not suffer as much as more southern states, the positive consequences will pass very quickly and 
the Russian agricultural industry should be ready for substantial losses (Dobrovidova 2013). In some way the 
Russian news agency acts as an opposition force by indirectly critiquing the opinion of the Russian Minister, 
something which the BBC does not have to do due to the existing political spectrum. This is particularly 
interesting, because of the official status of RIA Novosti and its pro-governmental stance.  
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In both cases the economic security of the states was also discussed. Russian articles mostly re-stated 
information on current and potential economic losses, and in the British news the problem of climate change 
regulations threatening the state’s energy and economic security was touched upon (e.g. Harrabin 2013a, 
2013b). Both BBC News and RIA Novosti often refer to the vocabulary carrying connotation of security threats 
(e.g. climate change dangers, imposed threats, risks and so on)8, but the Russian titles are more alarmist and 
negative. For instance, ‘climate change is killing thousands of penguin chicks yearly’9 (RIA Novosti 2014c), 
‘the past year reminded of possible large-scale cataclysms due to climate change’10 (RIA Novosti 2014d), 
‘global warming is threatening nuclear waste land fields in Novaya Zemlya’11 (RIA Novosti 2014b), ‘climate 
change led to ticks’ invasion in Russia’12 (Ermachenkov 2013). In one of the analysed RIA Novosti articles, the 
definition of climate security has been provided to include the health of the population, droughts, floods, 
forest fires, degradation of permafrost, the upset of the environmental balance, spread of infections, and 
increase in expenses of electricity use for the air-conditioning during the summer time (RIA Novosti 2013b). 
The alarming coverage of climate change is a good way of producing a dramatic story line and attracting the 
attention of the broader audience as well as moving the topic up the hierarchy of perceived security risks. 
But it can also trigger a feeling of disbelief (‘it is too bad to be real’) (Poberezhskaya 2015) or, as has been 
discussed earlier, similarly to the negative impact of securitisation, alarming coverage can lead to a passive 
response from the audience (‘it is too bad, so there is nothing we can do’). This observed difference can also 
be related to the states’ visions of the possible solutions of the problems, which is discussed in the next 
section.   
The observed patterns reveal that, on the one hand, the climate change problem is of global character 
(the negative consequences of which do not acknowledge states’ borders), but on the other, journalists 
desire to connect the problem with the audience’s interests, thus putting into conflict local and global 
memories of climate change events. Even though the consequences of climate change include global 
economic degradation, current or potential financial losses are mostly looked at (by both media outlets) 
through the prism of their nation states and their memories.  
 
8. Identifying the ‘solution’ in the news discourse 
Traditionally the responses or the ‘solution’ to climate change have been divided into two grand categories 
– mitigation of climate change and adaptation to its consequences. Mitigation aims to deal with the causes 
of climate change (such as human induced GHG emissions or de-forestation) and adaptation suggests steps 
towards reducing our vulnerability towards the negative consequences of climate change (UNFCCC 2014). 
Hence, most of the proposed solutions to the climate change security threat have fallen within the adaptation 
or mitigation grouping.  
Table 3. Percentage of the various types of proposed solutions in BBC News and RIA Novosti  
                                                          
8 In Russian, [opasnot’ izmeneniia klimata, prinosiashchii ugrozu, risk].    
9 [Izmenenie klimata ubivaet tysiachi ptentsov pingvinov ezhegodno – uchenye]   
10[Minuvshii God Napomnil o Vozmozhnykh Masshtabnykh Kataklizmakh iz-za Izmeneniia Klimata – VMO]  
11[Global’noe Poteplenie Ugrozhaet Radioaktivnym Svalkam na Novoi Zemle –MCHS RF] 





As table 3 demonstrates, both media outlets have devoted a fair amount of attention to processes related to 
adaptation and mitigation, but clear preferences between the two can be observed. BBC News has 
mentioned or discussed the mitigation steps twice as often as RIA Novosti. Among the proposed solutions is 
the development of the renewable energy sector (in the UK and worldwide), switching to the more extensive 
use of gas instead of coal or oil (e.g. there has been a heated debate on shale gas exploration) and further 
referencing to the global reduction in GHG emissions. It also included the debate on the UK mitigation 
commitments and the economic crisis which I discussed above. For instance, one of the studied articles titled 
‘Wavering on UK climate policy 'not justified' (Harrabin 2013b), covering the issue from different angles 
presents two types of security concerns – economic and environmental, which eventually lead to the 
different views on the solution of the problem where, on the one hand, the UK Climate Change Committee 
states that ‘no change in global science or policy justifies a slackening of effort’, whilst, on the other, the 
national Treasury representatives claim that they ‘want to tackle climate change, but it should be done in a 
way that doesn't put huge costs on people's energy bills or destroys manufacturing jobs’.  
RIA Novosti, on the other hand, focuses more on the adaptive measures which includes the timely 
anticipation and preparation for natural disasters to reduce the destructive outcomes of climate change. A 
number of articles were devoted to the protection of endangered species (not fighting the actual cause but 
taking care of the surviving populations) and adaptation of the agricultural industry. Nicole Detraz and 
Michele Betsill suggest that discourse of ‘environmental conflict’ defines the choice of policies which are 
‘aimed at short-term adaptation strategies as a mean of avoiding violent conflict’ (2009: 306). Indeed, as has 
been mentioned above, Russian media coverage assumed the more extreme sense of security concern with 
providing more links (than its British counterpart) between climate change and open conflict or more urgent 
security threats. This difference in addressing climate change risks enables us to raise concerns of different 
potential policy approaches within these two countries. For instance, the RF, reluctant to commit to the pro-
active GHG emission reduction strategy, will concentrate on policies which deal with the outcomes of climate 
change and try to reduce the potential losses. Whilst the UK, with its relative lack of fossil fuel resources and 
greater GHG reduction commitments, persists in promoting the agenda of climate change mitigation. 
The prioritisation of the adaptation measures over the mitigation ones can be linked with the nature 
of the climate change securitisation process within the studied media discourse. As it has been mentioned 
above, one of the most ‘popular’ securitising actors within the selected body of articles published by the 
Russian news agency was the Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of 
Natural Disasters which mostly deals with the consequences of the security threats, when disasters have 
already taken place or are very likely to happen in the near future. Subsequently this type of ‘securitising 

















needed in order to determine the exact correlation (or even causation) between the type of securitising actor 
and the proposed response, especially as regards national memories.  
The analysis does demonstrate some similarities between the studied media sources. Both outlets pay 
approximately an equal amount of attention to ‘global cooperation’ as the solution to climate change threats. 
It should be noted that this category was ascribed to the news article which did not specify what exactly 
should be done in terms of battling the dangers of climate change, but instead the text would refer to the 
urgent needs of the global agreement. RIA Novosti and BBC News have also mentioned a number of 
solutions/responses to climate change which were grouped within the category ‘other’, where once more, 
the media outlets have demonstrated parallels in their coverage by referring to the need of informing citizens 
about climate change threats, facilitating and promoting climate change research and improving national 
climate policies.   
10 Conclusion  
Securitising climate change presents a problematic area in the academic debate as well as for policy makers. 
Political actors rely on the security discourse to achieve certain political goals, e.g to ‘delegitimise opposition’, 
‘to access the power-centralising aspect of securitisation’ (Hayes and Knox-Hayes 2014: 85) or to resort to 
unpopular political decisions. At the same time it has been argued that bringing climate change into the 
security realm sometimes can be damaging to the whole process of resolving the problem of anthropogenic 
climate change. Creating the alarmist perception of the problem can lead to the stagnation of the public 
response and the re-direction of attention towards managing the negative consequences of environmental 
degradation rather than trying to eliminate the causes. 
This analysis has demonstrated that at the level of the government discourse the RF and the UK differ 
in their approach to the climate change policy. However, the analysis of the two media outlets has showed 
more similarities than differences. In both BBC News and RIA Novosti climate change has been raised in the 
context of human, economic, national, water, environment, food and energy security. In both cases the 
threats of climate change have been proclaimed by various actors - the international scientific community, 
NGOs or state officials. The referent object of the securitisation process included the global ecosystem, the 
global community and states’ security. It was particularly interesting that in both BBC News and RIA Novosti, 
the UK and the RF (respectively) have been addressed as a security object in almost equal proportion. The 
trend of similarities was also witnessed within the proposed solutions to the climate change dangers. 
However, in the Russian case more attention was paid to adaptation whilst in the analysed British media 
discourse the mitigation tools became the priority.  
Malksoo argues that memory ‘emerges as a vital self-identity need as it is invoked to constitute the 
central narrative of a state about its past in order to form a core part of its consistent sense of the self in the 
present’ (2015: 224). If we look at the variances in media coverage from the point of view of the states’ 
historical record (which to some extent correlates with national memory) then we can speculate how the 
past has pre-determined certain frames existing within the climate or environmental discourse.  For instance, 
both countries went through the stage of rapid industrial development—the UK in the nineteenth century 
and the RF (as part of the USSR) in the twentieth—which induced carbon-dependent economies. In the UK 
this past has been accepted and even the most economic-oriented major party—the Conservatives—has 
tried to come to terms with it and to present a new vision of their environmental policies albeit often 
reversing their environmental policies in favour of the economic ones. In the Russian case, the Soviet legacy 
played a significant role in forming the perception of nature as something which can be sacrificed towards 
economic prosperity (Henry 2010). It is only with the Chernobyl nuclear disaster that the environment fully 
entered the official discourse (the disaster became part of the national trauma13, that is ‘remain[ing] in the 
memory of all Russians as the ‘‘people’s disaster’ (Zykova 2007: 213) and becoming part of a narrative of 
                                                          
13 It could be argued that, at first, the Chernobyl disaster was intensified by the absence of any national memory of 
the catastrophic influence of a man-mad environmental disaster. As Zykova (2007: 2006) points out, being convinced 
by Soviet propaganda of the idea of the ‘safe peaceful atom’, people were unprepared for such devastating 
consequences which slowed down some protective responses. However, later the disaster led to another extreme 
reaction - ‘radioanxiety’, a psychological stress which has shaped people’s perception of nuclear technology and the 
environment.   
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ecological and man-made catastrophes; in its duration it has been as long as the discourse in the west—from 
the 1980s). Unlike in the British case, instead of ‘acceptance’, post-Soviet Russia has tried to distant itself 
from what happened in the past and divert the discussion towards the current state of the problem. 
Therefore, it is only logical to see the prioritisation of adaptation policies (how can we adjust our lives to 
survive) over mitigation policies (how should we accept the historic responsibility and try to eliminate the 
cause of the problem).  
The question of the historic responsibility—as a form of national memory—is extremely tricky in the 
climate change debate, even not going deep into the ethical discussion, it leaves many controversial 
questions for the states to consider. In this light, even the Russian official line of ‘common and differentiated 
responsibilities’ becomes very obscure. Can any highly advanced European country such as the UK, ever be 
seen as a leader in environmental politics (considering its industrial past)? Can the ‘new state’ of the Russian 
Federation escape the Soviet Union’s environmental policies? If not, how should this influence Russia’s share 
of ‘responsibilities’? Can the current economic and social conditions be a priority in defining the state’s 
commitments? The temporal and mnemonic characteristics of climate change (caused in the past, worsened, 
and experienced in the present, but with the worst still to be seen in the future), makes finding the answers 
to these questions a very difficult task indeed.          
In conclusion, it should be noted that the studied media coverage cannot be equated with national 
climate change policy. Mass media in this case are understood as the tools of communicating climate change 
risk and demonstrating general areas of climate related security concerns. Jorn Rusen notes that ‘the 
interpretation of the past serves as a means for understanding the present and expecting the future’ (2008: 
3). Media can be seen as a reservoir of the collective memory of climate change risk, how the environmental 
problem is remembered and perceived by the general public and the political elite. Therefore, by analysing 
mass media, it allows us to gain an understanding of the dominant frames in climate discourse, how it is 
addressed from the point of view of risk and security, it also allows us to see how and why climate change 
security risks have been communicated at the national level and how the current representation of the 
problem will influence future discourse. At the same time it can be argued that the popularisation of these 
themes can lead to the legitimisation of certain policies and approaches (McDonald 2013). In this case, 
further analysis of the climate change discourse in the selected case studies will allow us to predict what 
actions the states are willing to take in order to deal with this environmental issue.  
It is apparent, that tackling climate change requires a joint effort from all European states, therefore 
countries need to identify common ground where they can reach an agreement. For example, they can do it 
by paying greater attention to the way climate change is framed at the national level and try to approach the 
problem from a similar angle. Then a stronger and unified Europe has a potential to champion global 
environmental prosperity.     
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